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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF GENETIC 
BIOBANKS:  INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR 
A POTENTIAL UNITED STATES BIOBANK 
Matthew J. Piehl* 
 
Alpha children wear gray.  They work much harder than we 
do, because they’re so frightfully clever.  I’m really awfully 
glad I’m a Beta, because I don’t work so hard.  And then we 
are much better than the Gammas and Deltas.  Gammas are 
stupid.  They all wear green, and Delta children wear khaki.  
Oh no, I don’t want to play with Delta children.  And 
Epsilons are still worse. . . . They’re too stupid to be able to 
read or write.  Besides they wear black, which is a beastly 
colour.  I’m so glad I’m a Beta.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The search for genetic links to human diseases has been a fascinating 
medical drama in the past two decades.  Genetic science offers incredible 
potential to unlock the mysteries of an individual’s current and future 
health risks and to produce medical tools that can predict, treat, and 
even cure disease.  However, as researchers discover more about genetic 
links to disease, the relationship between genetic information and 
diseases appears to grow more complicated.2  It is now known that 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) causes not only single-gene disorders 
such as Huntington’s Disease, but also multifactorial and polygenic 
diseases,3 in which a physical response is produced by a combination of 
multiple genes and environmental factors, and even predispositions or 
                                                 
* B.S., 2008, Duke University; J.D., 2011, University of Virginia School of Law.  I would 
like to thank Professor Richard J. Bonnie for his comments and guidance on drafts of this 
Article.  I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering support. 
1 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 27–28 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics ed., 
HarperCollins Publishers 2006) (1932) (quoting “the trumpet” speaker system in Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World).  Huxley’s novel details a futuristic world that has manipulated 
reproductive technology to create a utopian society separated into a caste system.  Id.  Brave 
New World warns of technology loosed without moral limits in place to protect us from 
ourselves.  Id. 
2 Henry T. Greely, Iceland’s Plan for Genomics Research:  Facts and Implications, 40 
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 155 (2000) [hereinafter Greely, Iceland’s Plan]. 
3 See Genetic Disease Information—pronto!, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO., 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/medicine/assist.shtml (last 
modified July 21, 2008) (providing a quick overview of genetic disorders). 
Piehl: The Brave New World of Genetic Biobanks: International Lessons fo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
70 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
susceptibilities to disease.4  Small, family-based studies can be useful for 
linking genetic variations to disease that “always have a genetic cause 
and where one genotype is completely penetrant”; however, they prove 
of little use in the majority of cases because multiple genes and 
environmental factors are implicated.5  Identification of genetic variants 
related to complex diseases requires correlation of genetic and non-
genetic data in larger human populations.  A better strategy to link 
genetic variations to complex diseases is to gather genetic, medical, and 
environmental data on a multitude of individuals and use the data to 
find relationships between all factors. 
One way to achieve this strategy would be to implement a 
nationwide genetic biobank.  A genetic biobank is “a stored collection of 
genetic samples in the form of blood or tissue, that can be linked with 
medical and genealogical or lifestyle information from a specific 
population, gathered using a process of generalized consent.”6  
Alternately, such databases are “collections of genetic sequence 
information, or of human tissue from which such information might be 
derived that are or could be linked to named individuals.”7  Biobanks 
facilitate large-scale research.  Some scientists consider a nationwide 
genetic biobank to be the “logical next step that would build on the 
complete sequencing of the human genome to enhance the 
understanding of common diseases and improve treatments and 
therapies” for disease.8  Long-term, large cohort studies made possible 
by a nationwide genetic biobank “may permit researchers to decipher 
the interplay between genes, the disease and the environment.”9  For this 
reason, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) in the United States has 
begun an investigation into the initial questions concerning the 
possibility of mounting a new large U.S. cohort study that would 
necessarily involve the construction of a genetic biobank for the United 
                                                 
4 Angela Brand, Helmut Brand & Tobias Schulte in den Bäumen, The Impact of Genetics 
and Genomics on Public Health, 16 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 8 (2008). 
5 Greely, Iceland’s Plan, supra note 2, at 156. 
6 Melissa A. Austin, Sarah Harding & Courtney McElroy, Genebanks:  A Comparison of 
Eight Proposed International Genetic Databases, 6 COMMUNITY GENETICS 37, 37 (2003). 
7 J.V. McHale, Regulating Genetic Databases:  Some Legal and Ethical Issues, 12 MED. L. REV. 
70, 71 (2004) (citing SCI. & TECH. COMM., HOUSE OF LORDS, FOURTH REPORT ¶ 3.3 (Mar. 2001) 
(U.K.)), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ 
ldselect/ldsctech/57/5701.htm). 
8 SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., POLICY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH UNDERTAKING A NEW LARGE U.S. POPULATION 
COHORT STUDY OF GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND DISEASE 1 (2007) [hereinafter POLICY ISSUES], 
(footnote omitted), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_LPS_ 
report.pdf. 
9 McHale, supra note 7, at 71. 
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States.10  In addition, in 2006, then-Senator Barack Obama called for the 
establishment of a national biobanking initiative when he introduced the 
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act.11  That proposed legislation 
would have required the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“DHHS”) to “establish a system for the integration of 
data, including genomic data and associated environmental and clinical 
health information” for the U.S. population.12 
A U.S. genetic biobank would have to find public support to be 
successful, so it must overcome fears of misuse and abuse.  One common 
concern is that third parties will use genetic information to the detriment 
of individual participants of the biobank—for example, to discriminate 
in employment or insurance on the basis of genetic information; to deny 
the individual access to health insurance completely; or, in the extreme, 
to manipulate genes in order to create a genetically stratified world like 
the one described in the movie Gattaca or in the quote from Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World that began this Article.13  The public health 
agencies that would control a genetic biobank must convince the 
population that a biobank does not seek to modify genes and that 
protections are in place to safeguard individuals.14 
To lay a foundation of trust with the public—a necessary participant 
in a genetic biobank—the United States can start by addressing four key 
ethical issues presented by biobanks:  (1) confidentiality and privacy of 
                                                 
10 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at 17–21.  To achieve maximum scientific results, a large 
biobank unique to the United States would be necessary.  Researchers should not 
generalize the findings from one small community to the entire United States given the 
enormous cultural and environmental diversity present.  Ellen Wright Clayton, The 
Complex Relationship of Genetics, Groups, and Health:  What It Means for Public Health, 30 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 290, 294 (2002).  Similarly, findings from Iceland or Estonia cannot be 
generalized to the much more diverse population living in the United States existing in 
different environmental conditions. Id.  “[A]lthough a potential new effort could seek to 
build on existing cohorts, new data collection and expanded consent would be needed 
from all study participants, and a new study design and infrastructure would be 
necessary.”  NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DESIGN 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL UNITED STATES POPULATION-BASED COHORT TO 
DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH:  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EXPERT PANEL 4 (2005) (parenthetical omitted), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/About/OD/ReportsPublications/PotentialUSCohort. 
pdf.  Therefore, the new cohort would face all the issues presented in this Article. 
11 Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2006, S. 3822, 109th Cong. (2006). 
12 Id. § 5(a)(2)(B)(i). 
13 Ellen Wright Clayton, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Genomic Medicine, 349 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 562, 562 (2003).  See generally HUXLEY, supra note 1; GATTACA (Columbia 
Pictures 1997) (describing a futuristic world that has manipulated reproductive 
technology). 
14 Angela Brand, Public Health and Genetics—A Dangerous Combination?, 15 EUR. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 114, 115 (2005). 
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information; (2) informed consent by the individual; (3) feedback of 
clinically significant information; and (4) the treatment of humans as 
research subjects.  This Article will address these four issues by looking 
at how three international leaders in genetic biobanking—Iceland, 
Estonia, and the United Kingdom—dealt with these ethical problems.15  
Part II will introduce the three nations’ international biobanks.  Part III 
will explore the four ethical issues and discuss how each international 
biobank addressed the issue and how their responses may translate to a 
U.S. biobank.  Because the treatment of humans as research subjects 
hinges on informed consent,16 those issues will be examined together.  
Finally, Part IV will propose that a nationwide biobank be instituted in 
the United States. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL BIOBANKS 
Three European nations are at the forefront of the genetic biobank 
movement:  Iceland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom.  The following 
sections will provide a short background of these international banks 
and their operations. 
A. Iceland 
Due to its relative isolation and small, homogenous population of 
only 270,000, which results in less genetic variation, Iceland has been 
described as an “island so inbred that it is a happy genetic hunting 
ground.”17  In addition, Iceland keeps extensive medical records on its 
population going back to 1915 that would aid researchers in their quest 
to link genetic variations to disease in an individual.18  Furthermore, 
because genealogy is so important to Icelandic culture, an extensive 
genealogical database exists that stretches as far back as 900 A.D., 
allowing scientists to “find a common ancestor between two people with 
                                                 
15 See Susan M.C. Gibbons et al., Lessons from European Population Genetic Databases:  
Comparing the Law in Estonia, Iceland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 12 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 
103, 104 (2005). 
16 See Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic 
Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343, 353 (2007) [hereinafter Greely, 
Genomic Biobanks]. 
17 MATT RIDLEY, GENOME:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 190–91 
(1999). 
18 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at D-4. 
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the same disease” or condition.19  For these reasons, the island nation 
contains a near perfect population for genetic research.20 
Iceland acted on these advantages in December 1998 by creating the 
first national genetic biobank when the Icelandic parliament, the 
Althingi, passed the Act on a Health Sector Database (“HSD Act”).21  The 
objective of the HSD Act was to “authorise the creation and operation of 
a centralised database of non-personally identifiable health data with the 
aim of increasing knowledge in order to improve health and health 
services.”22  At its core, the HSD Act authorizes the creation of a Health 
Sector Database (“HSD”), which is “[a] collection of data containing 
information on health and other related information, recorded in a 
standardised systematic fashion on a single centralised database, 
intended for processing and as a source of information.”23 
The HSD Act, however, did not actually create a biobank; in fact, it 
expressly disclaimed such a creation by stating that “[t]he legislation 
does not apply to the storage or handling of, or access to, biological 
samples.”24  The HSD is merely a collection of medical records of the 
Icelandic people.  The actual creation of the genetic biobank, and of the 
HSD, would be done by a licensee operating under the terms of the HSD 
Act.25  In 2000, the Althingi granted a twelve-year license to construct 
and manage an electronic database for all of Iceland’s health records to 
deCode genetics, Inc. (“deCode”), a private commercial company with 
American and Icelandic ties, that apparently instigated the creation of 
the HSD Act.26  In short, deCode was granted a license to create an 
electronic database that would contain extensive medical information on 
each Icelander and to connect that database with Iceland’s genealogy 
database.27  Iceland also granted deCode a third database that would be 
created privately by deCode that would consist of genetic samples from 
volunteers within the Icelandic population.28  An individual could opt 
out of the genetic database by express statement to deCode,29 a provision 
                                                 
19 Id. at A-6. 
20 See Greely, Iceland’s Plan, supra note 2, at 157–61 (providing an extensive history that 
details why Iceland contains a geneticist’s dream population). 
21 Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998 (1998) (Ice.), available at 
http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/acts-of-Parliament/nr/17659#kafli1. 
22 Id. § I, art. 1. 
23 Id. § I, art. 3, cl. 1. 
24 Id. § I, art. 2. 
25 Id. § II, art. 4. 
26 Yael Bregman-Eschet, Note, Genetic Databases and Biobanks:  Who Controls Our Genetic 
Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 38 (2006). 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29 Id. at 41. 
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that only 20,000 of Iceland’s 270,000 citizens took advantage of within the 
first four years of the license.30  To date, though, no comprehensive 
database has yet materialized, but important lessons can be learned from 
Iceland’s cardinal attempt. 
B. Estonia 
Estonia’s parliament, Riigikogu, passed the Human Genes Research 
Act in December 2000, launching the Estonian Genome Project (“EGP”).31  
The EGP is a national genetic biobank that also contains medical 
information such as lifestyle reports, demographics, and genealogy.32  
The EGP Foundation, a nonprofit foundation created by the Republic of 
Estonia in 2001, legally owns the biobank.33  The Foundation is the true 
owner of the database and acts as a privacy shield, but a for-profit 
company created by the foundation, EGeen, is the exclusive licensee of 
the biobank and has the rights to set up and sell access to the information 
collected.34  The EGP Foundation “has the right to organise [sic] the 
taking of DNA samples, to prepare descriptions of health status and 
genealogies, to code and decode, preserve, destroy and issue 
descriptions of health status and genealogies, to perform genetic research 
and to collect, preserve, destroy and issue genetic data”; all of these 
rights, except for the right to code and decode information, have been 
delegated to EGeen.35  The biobank is expected to include nearly one 
million of Estonia’s 1.4 million people.36  A small test run of 10,000 
people has been conducted under a pilot program,37 and to date, over 
40,000 participants have donated samples to the biobank.38 
                                                 
30 Geneviève Cardinal & Mylène Deschênes, Surveying the Population Biobankers, in 
POPULATIONS AND GENETICS:  LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 37, 40 (Bartha Maria 
Knoppers ed., 2003). 
31 Andres Rannamäe, Estonian Genome Project—Large Scale Health Status Description and 
DNA Collection, in POPULATIONS AND GENETICS, supra note 30, at 17, 18; see also Human 
Genes Research Act (RT I 2000, 104, 685) (2001) (Est.) (creating the EGP). 
32 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at D-4.  See generally ESTONIAN GENOME CTR., 
http://www.geenivaramu.ee/index.php? lang=eng (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (providing 
an English-language website operated by the EGP). 
33 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 39. 
34 Rannamäe, supra note 31, at 18. 
35 Id. at 24. 
36 Riku Lähteenmaki, Estonian Parliament Considers Genome Law, 18 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1135, 1135 (2000). 
37 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 348. 
38 What is the Genome Center?, ESTONIAN GENOME CTR., http://www.geenivaramu.ee/ 
index.php?id=102 (last visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
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C. United Kingdom 
Unlike the biobanks in Iceland and Estonia, the project in the United 
Kingdom does not exist due to a single national piece of legislation, and 
it does not plan to include a vast majority of the population.39  The UK 
project, termed UK Biobank, plans to enroll as many as half a million 
volunteers age forty-five to sixty-nine.40  The project was finally 
launched in March 2006 after six years of planning.41  A pilot run of 
nearly four thousand residents from Manchester was declared a success 
in the summer of 2006, so UK Biobank is now collecting information and 
samples from volunteers.42  The Biobank is a collaboration between the 
UK Medical Research Council, the Department of Health, and the 
Wellcome Trust, which is the United Kingdom’s largest independent 
medical research charity.43  Tom Meade, director of the Medical Research 
Council Epidemiology and Medical Care Unit, stresses that, unlike the 
Iceland biobank that is run by a commercial company, UK Biobank is 
controlled by “independent research organizations.”44  No legislation or 
guidelines relate specifically to UK Biobank.45 
Through research, UK Biobank strives to understand how genetic, 
lifestyle, and environmental risk factors contribute to disease, both as 
discrete factors and through their combined effects.46  It is designed to be 
a longitudinal prospective cohort study that will follow the volunteers 
for ten years.47  UK Biobank is particularly concerned with “diseases of 
later life, such as cancer and cardiovascular conditions,” leading to the 
narrow age range of the project.48  As in Iceland, the project will be 
immensely aided by medical records kept by the UK National Health 
Service, which “treats the single largest group of people anywhere in the 
world.”49  The UK Biobank-driven study “is to be in ‘public ownership’ 
                                                 
39 See Improving the Health of Future Generations, BIOBANKUK, http://www.ukbiobank. 
ac.uk/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that the genesis of this biobank lies with 
independent research charities as well as the government). 
40 Mylène Deschênes & Clémentine Sallée, Accountability in Population Biobanking:  
Comparative Approaches, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 41 (2005). 
41 See Kathryn Senior, UK Biobank Launched to Mixed Reception, 5 LANCET NEUROLOGY 
390, 390 (2006). 
42 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 348. 
43 Frances C. Rawle, UK DNA Sample Collections for Research, in POPULATIONS AND 
GENETICS, supra note 30, at 3. 
44 Michael Hagmann, U.K. Plans Major Medical DNA Database, 287 SCI. 1184, 1184 (2000). 
45 See Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 41. 
46 Rawle, supra note 43, at 3. 
47 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 41. 
48 McHale, supra note 7, at 72. 
49 Claire Tilstone, Further Plans Announced for National Biobanks, 7 LANCET ONCOLOGY 
195, 195 (2006) (quoting Rory Collins, principal investigator for UK Biobank). 
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through the operation of a new independent body created by [the 
Medical Research Council, the Wellcome Trust], and the [Department of 
Health] called ‘Hubco.’”50  Outside researchers can obtain anonymized 
data from Hubco if approved by a research ethics committee.51 
III.  FOUR MAJOR ETHICAL ISSUES IN POPULATION BIOBANKS 
Genetic biobanks present unique ethical issues that traditional 
biomedical research does not present.  Traditional research involves a 
single researcher or an established group of researchers who obtain and 
utilize samples in defined ways after obtaining informed consent from 
each individual research subject for that use.52  For example, one 
laboratory at a university may ask cancer patients to test a new 
treatment.  The scientists would ask for a single blood sample to 
determine serum titer to test how the treatment is affecting immune 
cells.  The researchers would be dealing with a defined small group of 
consenting individuals for an identified disease.  In contrast, 
with biobanks:  (1) the individual or entity obtaining the 
sample may not be engaged in research, but may be only 
a broker or intermediary supplying specimens to other 
researchers; (2) the purpose of a biobank is to develop a 
repository that can be used for many research protocols, 
often in numerous scientific areas; (3) a biobank 
contemplates future research activities, including 
research by investigators who cannot be specified at the 
time of the sample collection; and (4) research using 
biobanks seeks to move beyond the one study/one 
informed consent model.53 
A national biobank must deal with these issues to be successful and 
to comply with ethical and legal standards.  Bioethicist Henry T. Greely 
has placed these unique concerns into groupings that will guide the 
discussion in the following sections:  (1) confidentiality and privacy; (2) 
informed consent and humans as research subjects; and (3) feedback of 
clinically significant information.54 
                                                 
50 McHale, supra note 7, at 72. 
51 Id. 
52 Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 
89 (2005). 
53 Id. 
54 See Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 349. 
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A. Confidentiality and Privacy 
The World Medical Association states, “[t]he right to privacy entitles 
people to exercise control over the use and disclosure of information 
about them as individuals.”55  Though privacy and confidentiality are 
often used interchangeably, their meanings differ slightly.  Privacy 
covers, inter alia, access to one’s biological sample or general medical 
information.56 Confidentiality, in contrast, generally connotes 
nondisclosure of private, identifiable information to third parties.57  
Because informed consent and access to the biological sample will be 
discussed in the next section, this section will focus on the nondisclosure 
of private information after access to that information has been granted 
through informed consent. 
Genes present a variety of unique problems to researchers in terms 
of confidentiality.  While genes can identify an individual’s place in the 
gene pool, they can also reveal the place of others.58  Family members 
share genetic information.  For example, a genetic sample from one 
individual would reveal many genes shared by that person’s mother, 
father, brothers, sisters, and so on.  This expected familial linkage, 
though, could also lead to realization that some family members are not, 
in fact, family at all.  As Greely puts it, “[c]omparing genomic 
information from two people thought to be related could lead to some 
unpleasant surprises, breaking families or blighting careers.”59  Genetic 
information also provides information unique to the individual, 
including much of the information sought by researchers—for example, 
propensities for future disease.  This information may cause worries 
about discrimination as a result of disclosure or loss of medical 
insurance.  Furthermore, exposure of an individual’s medical 
information carries the usual worries of disclosure of health data—
revelations of substance abuse or sexually transmitted infections, for 
instance. 
Complete anonymization could protect the genetic and medical 
information, but this approach would greatly decrease the viability of a 
                                                 
55 World Med. Ass’n, WMA Declaration on Ethical Considerations Regarding Health 
Databases 1, ¶ 1 (2002), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/ 
d1/index.html.pdf?print-media-type&footer-right=[page]/[toPage]. 
56 See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Privacy and Confidentiality of Genetic 
Information:  What Rules for the New Science?, 2 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 401, 
402 (2001) (discussing the broad concept of privacy). 
57 John A. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Genetic Biobanking, in POPULATIONS AND 
GENETICS, supra note 30, at 297, 302. 
58 Sheila A.M. McLean, The Genetics Revolution:  Can the Law Cope?, in GENETICS & ETHICS 
35, 43 (Gerard Magill ed., 2004). 
59 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 350. 
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biobank.  Anonymization strips “the information of all identifiers, trying 
to make it impossible for anyone . . . to establish individual identities.”60  
Unfortunately, this method also makes it impossible for a biobank 
researcher or manager to identify the individual, severely limiting the 
usefulness of the samples or data in research.61  According to the NIH, 
“in a longitudinal cohort study, anonymity is not possible because it 
would prevent the collection of additional health status and exposure 
information in later phases.”62  Researchers must be able to connect 
genetic information to the individual.  In addition, anonymization may 
not even prove that safe.  This was proven by a recent appointee to the 
privacy and security seat of the Health Information Technology Policy 
Committee, Professor Latanya Sweeney, while she was completing her 
doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The State of 
Massachusetts made “anonymized medical information” available to the 
public, claiming it was safe because all means of identification had first 
been removed.63  The medical data only contained the person’s 
diagnosis, gender, birth date, and zip code.64  Sweeney purchased a voter 
list from Cambridge City Hall for twenty-five dollars, linked the minimal 
demographic data with the information in the voter list, and successfully 
linked a single file to then-Governor William Weld within a few days.65  
This leak could have been avoided by removing even the minimal 
demographic data, but, again, that would lessen its scientific impact.  In 
sum, “[t]he more data is removed . . .the more scientific value is lost; the 
more data is kept, the less the data is truly anonymized.”66 
The alternative to complete anonymization is key coding.  This is the 
most widely used method of protecting confidentiality in health research 
because it allows the researcher to update the data set.67  When data are 
key coded, the identifying information is separated from the substantive 
data—in this case, the genetic and medical information—but the biobank 
maintains a link between the two data sets by marking each set with a 
random, arbitrary code number.68  This code would be kept in a secure 
                                                 
60 Id. at 351. 
61 See Rothstein, supra note 52, at 94. 
62 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at 57. 
63 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 352. 
64  Jonathan Shaw, Exposed:  The Erosion of Privacy in the Internet Era, HARV. MAG., Sept.–
Oct. 2009, at 39. 
65 Id. 
66 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 353. 
67 WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., PRIVACY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY, AND IDENTIFIABILITY IN GENOMIC RESEARCH 17 (Oct. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/About/OD/ReportsPublications/IdentifiabilityWorksho
pWhitePaper.pdf. 
68 Id. 
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location and would not normally be accessible to the researcher.69  The 
researcher would have to go through a trusted intermediary to obtain 
updates on the file.70  Like other confidential data sets, the key coding 
system could be misused by rogue biobank officials or stolen by third 
parties.  Criminal sanctions could be threatened, however, to mitigate 
these threats.  Each nation studied in this Article uses some type of key 
coding system. 
The Data Protection Commission (“the Commission”) runs the key 
coding system for Iceland’s biobank.71  According to the HSD Act, 
Personal identification shall be coded before entry on the 
database, so that it is ensured that the licensee’s staff 
work[s] only with non-personally identifiable 
data. . . . Health data shall be transferred in coded form 
in order to ensure their security.  Personal identification 
shall be coded one-way, i.e. by coding that cannot be 
traced using a decoding key.  The Data Protection . . . 
[Commission] shall carry out further coding of personal 
identification, using those methods that the commission 
deems to ensure confidentiality best.72 
In essence, personnel at the licensed health institution gather the 
health information, code it, and transfer it in non-personally identifiable 
form to the database operator.73  Then, the database operator who 
compiles information for the biobank enters the coded data into the 
bank.  He is not able to link the data to any specific individual; only the 
Commission holds the encrypted identification number.74  To link this 
data with its genetic and genealogical databases, deCode would need the 
encrypted identification numbers from the Commission.  The HSD Act 
provides for access to the key with some major limitations: 
The licensee [deCode] shall be authorised to process 
data on the health sector database from the health data 
recorded there, provided that data are processed and 
                                                 
69  Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 350. 
70 See id. at 351 (describing the procedures of coding whereby researchers only receive a 
code to identify a sample that they cannot directly trace to a particular individual). 
71 Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998, § III, art. 7 (1998) (Ice.), available at 
http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/acts-of-Parliament/nr/17659#kafli1. 
72 Id. 
73 Alice Hsieh, Note, A Nation’s Genes for a Cure to Cancer:  Evolving Ethical, Social and 
Legal Issues Regarding Population Genetic Databases, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 385–86 
(2004). 
74 Id. 
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connected in such a way that they cannot be linked to 
identifiable individuals.  The licensee shall develop 
methods and protocols that meet the requirements of the 
[Commission] in order to ensure confidentiality in 
connecting data from the health-sector database, from a 
database of genealogical data, and from a database of 
genetic data. . . . The licensee may not grant direct access 
to data on the database.75 
As part of its exclusive license, deCode must develop procedural 
rules for cross-referencing of data between databases, and those rules 
must be approved by the Commission.76  All storage and processing of 
data must take place in Iceland, and only the approved licensee may 
have direct access to the data.77  As a result of these restrictions, 
however, someone at deCode will eventually have to make the link 
between the coded health data and the genealogical data, opening the 
door for a possible breach of confidentiality.78  Because employment of 
Icelanders was a major selling point for deCode in bidding for the 
exclusive license, chances are that an Icelander will be in control of this 
knowledge.79  Iceland is a relatively small nation, so the employee stands 
a greater chance of knowing the research subject.80  The HSD Act 
attempts to control potential leaks by requiring an oath of confidentiality 
from each of the licensee’s employees that continues even after 
employment ceases.81  Furthermore, the HSD Act provides for 
compensation to victims of a security breach to be paid by the licensee.82  
In other words, deCode would be held liable for actions taken by 
malevolent employees. 
Estonia also uses a coding system, but with an added layer of 
security for personal information.  An authorized data collector gathers 
phenotypic or health data first; this includes information on health 
status, genealogy, lifestyle, environmental factors, and drug response.83  
Next, the data collector takes a tissue sample from the donor for the 
DNA collection.  These data are given a unique temporary transportation 
                                                 
75 Act on a Health Sector Database § IV, art. 10 (Ice.). 
76 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 67. 
77 § IV, art. 10. 
78 Greely, Iceland’s Plan, supra note 2, at 184. 
79 Id. at 185–86. 
80 Id. at 186. 
81 Act on a Health Sector Database § IV, art. 11 (Ice.). 
82 Id. § VI, art. 17. 
83 Rannamäe, supra note 31, at 26. 
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code.84  This code is replaced at the storage facility by the database 
processor who assigns a permanent sixteen-digit code so that the 
collection agent cannot connect the genetic information with the personal 
identity of the donor.85  For an additional level of security, the 
phenotypic data is stripped of personal identifiers, such as names, birth 
dates, and addresses, and given a second code saved in a separate 
database of personal data.86  This double coding system allows 
researchers to link genetic data with health data without being able to 
see personal data that could easily identify the research subject.  That 
data can only be connected back to the person under limited 
circumstances—to find the donor to correct erroneous genealogical data, 
for instance.87  Researchers will only handle coded, identity-free data; 
only persons appointed by the EGP handle the coding and decoding 
duties.88 
Despite assurances from UK Biobank that DNA samples and 
information are stored anonymously,89 the UK project actually uses a 
basic coding system, misleadingly termed “reversible anonymisation.”90  
“[P]ersonal identifying information [is] separated from participants’ data 
and samples and . . . linked [with] a code that has no external 
meaning.”91  This is the quintessential coding system.  Only a few UK 
Biobank staff operating under strict confidentiality pledges hold the code 
key for re-linking information, and researchers will not be given access 
to the key.92 
Over one hundred bills specifically targeting genetic privacy have 
been introduced in Congress, but none have been signed into law; the 
United States thus has no federal laws on the issue.93  Nevertheless, a 
legal framework for the protection of private information does exist.  
First, federal agencies have guidance on using a coding system in human 
                                                 
84 Id. at 30. 
85 Hsieh, supra note 73, at 386; see also Main Provisions of the Human Genes Researsh [sic] 
Act, ESTONIAN GENOME CTR., http://www.geenivaramu.ee/index.php?id=105 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Main Provisions] (detailing guidelines pertaining to the 
establishment and maintenance of the Gene Bank). 
86 Rannamäe, supra note 31, at 30. 
87 Id. at 33. 
88 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 66. 
89 See Confidentiality, BIOBANKUK, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/faqs/confidentiality. 
php (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (answering frequently asked questions about privacy and 
third-party access to the information). 
90 UK BIOBANK, UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK VERSION 3.0 11 (Oct. 
2007), available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/EGF20082.pdf. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 DOROTHY C. WERTZ & JOHN C. FLETCHER, GENETICS AND ETHICS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 170 (2004). 
Piehl: The Brave New World of Genetic Biobanks: International Lessons fo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
82 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
research.  The U.S. Office of Human Research Protections (“OHRP”) 
defines “coded” as: 
(1) identifying information (such as name or social 
security number) that would enable the investigator to 
readily ascertain the identity of the individual to whom 
the private information or specimens pertain has been 
replaced with a number, letter, symbol, or combination 
thereof (i.e., the code); and 
(2) a key to decipher the code exists, enabling linkage of 
the indentifying information to the private information 
or specimens.94 
If a national biobank were created, this guidance could be used as a 
foundation for rules on codifying personal information of participants.   
Second, a right to privacy has been generally recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, though privacy is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution.95  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme 
Court of the United States initially found that “specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance.  Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy.”96  The Court has since declared that the right of 
privacy is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty.97 
In Whalen v. Roe, the Court addressed what privacy means for 
medical information when it stated the following:  “The cases sometimes 
                                                 
94 OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL 
SPECIMENS 3 (2008) [hereinafter OHRP], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/ 
cdebiol.pdf. 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  In language reminiscent of the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of liberty against intrusion by the federal government, the Fourteenth 
Amendment states, in part, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  Id. 
96 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citation omitted). 
97 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (“[T]he Court has recognized that a right 
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution. . . . [including] in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).  Though Roe involved a challenge to state 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on state actions, it has been assumed 
to apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment as well.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (applying the right 
of privacy to states through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
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characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two 
different kinds of interests.  One is the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”98  The 
first type of privacy listed by the Court concerns confidentiality; the 
second type deals with informed consent, which will be discussed in the 
following section.  Despite the seemingly unfettered privacy right hinted 
at in Griswold, the Court in Whalen limited the protections afforded by 
the Due Process Clause over the interest in keeping medical information 
private.  As Justice Powell pointed out, 
Griswold v. Connecticut held that a State cannot 
constitutionally prohibit a married couple from using 
contraceptives in the privacy of their home.  Although 
the broad language of the opinion includes a discussion 
of privacy, the constitutional protection there discovered 
also related to (1) marriage; (2) privacy in the home; and 
(3) the right to use contraceptives.  Whatever the ratio 
decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general 
interest in freedom from disclosure of private 
information.99 
In other words, while Griswold offers constitutional protection that 
may be extended to personal medical information, that right is not 
absolute.  The Constitution does not categorically prohibit government 
intrusion on the right of privacy implicated here.  The majority opinion 
in Whalen points out that disclosure of private medical information to 
third parties, such as doctors and public health agencies, is an essential 
reality of the modern health system, “even when the disclosure may 
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.”100  The threat of 
wrongful, unwarranted disclosure of that information is not enough to 
block government collection of the information as long as proper 
security measures and judicial supervision is in place.101  Indeed, many 
government actions require the collection of such information, including 
the ”collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security 
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed 
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws.”102   
                                                 
98 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
99 Id. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 602 (majority opinion). 
101 Id. at 600–01. 
102  Id. at 605. 
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The Court’s analysis seems to assume a constitutional interest in 
privacy of medical information; however, it never explicitly states that 
this is true or how important such an interest might be.  Rather, the 
Court appears to assume the right for purposes of the decision.  The 
Third Circuit offers a little more guidance on the issue in United States v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., stating that government “intrusion into the 
zone of privacy surrounding medical records” can be entered if the 
societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest in a specific 
case.103  Seven factors must be weighed in determining whether an 
intrusion into an individual’s privacy is justified: 
the type of record requested, the information it does or 
might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent 
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to 
the relationship in which the record was generated, the 
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether 
there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public 
policy, or other recognizable public interest militating 
toward access.104 
If a future court used these factors to consider the constitutionality of 
a genetic biobank, insofar as the government’s incursion on private 
medical records is at issue, the biobank stands a fair chance of success as 
long as the government implements a secure coding system 
supplemented by statutory remedies for security violations.  This should 
ensure the adequacy of safeguards as required in the test.  The degree of 
need for access should not present a hurdle for biobanks.  As discussed 
previously, the research viability of a genetic biobank greatly decreases 
without access to personal health data.  A genetic biobank would require 
complete access to private medical information to be useful.  
Furthermore, an agency implementing a national biobank would 
certainly be acting under an express statutory mandate or articulated 
public policy as the test favors.  Conversely, the injury from disclosure 
may be lower than expected in the unlikely event that codified 
information is accidentally released to the general public or stolen by a 
third party.  The law already shields most Americans from insurance or 
employment discrimination that stems from health-related 
information.105 
                                                 
103 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
104 Id. 
105 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 350. 
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A genetic biobank must ensure that private medical information 
remains confidential and private.  Although the United States has no 
comprehensive law pertaining to genetic information,106 the Supreme 
Court may offer constitutional protection against unwarranted violations 
of privacy.  In addition, federal health agencies have guidance in place 
from the OHRP on using a coding system for sensitive information. 
B. Informed Consent and Humans as Research Subjects 
Informed consent affects the second part of privacy elucidated in 
Whalen—“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”107  This principle has been a pillar of medical 
research since World War II and the Nuremberg trials.  The Nuremberg 
Code’s principles for human research state that voluntary consent is 
essential.108  The Code states the following: 
[Voluntary consent] means that the person involved 
should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so 
situated as to be able to exercise free power of 
choice . . . and should have sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter 
involved as to enable him to make an understanding 
and enlightened decision.109 
The informed consent process involves three elements:  (1) the 
information must be disclosed to potential participants; (2) the researcher 
                                                 
106 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act allays some concerns over illicit use 
of genetic information by protecting against misuse by insurance companies and 
employers.  See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting the 
discriminatory use of genetic information in the context of employment and health 
insurance).  No statute protects against misuse of genetic information in other contexts, 
however. 
107 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600. 
108 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS  UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL  LAW NO. 10, VOL. II  181–82 (1949), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-II.pdf; 
Directives for Human Experimentation:  Nuremburg Code, OFF. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).  “The 
Nuremberg Code is judicial law created [for] . . . a specific historical situation,” so it does 
not have legal force of legislative enactment.  Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans:  
Regulation in Switzerland, the European Union, and the United States, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 
47–49 (2005).  Still, the intention of the Nuremberg Code is to elucidate ethical principles of 
human research, and these principles have been endorsed by subsequent statements, such 
as the Declaration of Helsinki.  Id. 
109 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 108, at 181. 
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must ascertain that the participant understands what has been disclosed; 
and (3) the participant must voluntarily agree to participate in the 
research.110  This means that the potential participant cannot be coerced 
or pressured into participating.  Informed consent is essentially the 
“clinical version” of autonomy, an ethical axiom that respects the 
decision-making authority of the individual.111  Concomitant with 
consent is the right of the individual to withdraw from the study.112  The 
individual should retain autonomy in the process and not feel trapped or 
stripped of liberty for taking part in the research.113 
Consent covers two important areas.  The first is the main action in 
which the participant donates the genetic sample and submits to any 
medical and personal data collection.114  The second covers any 
subsequent use of that genetic sample or the health data.115  The problem 
for genetic biobanks is that subsequent uses are likely unknown at the 
time of sample collection.116  Future research questions may not yet be 
conceptualized, and future researchers may not yet be involved in the 
biobank project.117  A nationwide genetic biobank could be created for 
one particular and distinct research study, thereby conforming to 
traditional norms of medical research and informed consent.118  This 
would be grossly expensive and a wasteful use of the available 
information.  In fact, it would defeat the primary purpose of a biobank—
to facilitate future research on the genetic factors of multiple diseases.119  
The alternative would be to seek out permission from each participant 
for every single new research study.  This also appears prohibitively 
                                                 
110 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
111 Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with Contemporary 
American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 175, 188–89 (2004). 
112 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 49. 
113 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic Variation—Lessons from 
Iceland, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1830, 1831 (2000) (arguing many scholars believe that 
“community consent” should also be required for nationwide genetic biobanks, because 
any findings of the biobank could characterize all citizens as a group); see also Henry T. 
Greely, Informed Consent and Other Ethical Issues in Human Population Genetics, 35 ANN. REV. 
GENETICS 785, 794 (2001) [hereinafter Greely, Informed Consent] (describing arguments for 
and against group consent).  The political process in a democratic nation, though, should 
provide an important check on governments attempting to implement a biobank, thereby 
serving as the community consultation required to obtain group consent.  This issue, 
therefore, will not be discussed in this Article.  A vigorous public debate should suffice. 
114 Carlos María Romeo Casabona, Genetics, Tissue- and Databases, 11 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 71, 
72 (2004). 
115 Id. at 72. 
116 Gibbons et al., supra note 15, at 105. 
117 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at 38. 
118 Gibbons et al., supra note 15, at 105–07. 
119 Id. 
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expensive and time-consuming.120  The challenge, then, for a genetic 
biobank is to implement a consent process that is broad enough to 
incorporate future research and uses of samples, but specific enough to 
comply with regulations and ethical objectives of informed consent 
principles.121 
Iceland’s HSD substitutes “presumed consent” for “informed 
consent” in the HSD Act.122  Iceland set the default rule as inclusion, 
perhaps the most controversial piece of the entire project, and provided 
an opt-out procedure for citizens rather than the usual opt-in process.123  
Article Eight of the HSD Act speaks of the rights of “patients,” but it 
never mentions consent.  Instead, it states that “[a] patient may request at 
any time that information on him/her not be entered onto the health-
sector database.  The patient’s request may apply to all existing 
information on him/her or that which may be recorded in the future, or 
to some specific information.”124  To opt-out of the database, Icelanders 
can file a form with the Director General of Public Health, who must 
make such forms available at health care centers.125  One study, however, 
did not find the forms at two of three centers visited, implying that 
distribution of the forms may be an issue.126 
This presumed consent, though, only applies to the health 
information and personal data collected for the medical information 
database created by the HSD Act.  As discussed in Part II, the HSD Act 
did not actually create the genetic biobank that stores biological samples; 
that responsibility was licensed to deCode.127  While Icelandic law may 
require informed consent from the individual for collection of a 
biological sample (i.e., the genetic sample),128 deCode has decided to 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 8, at 38. 
122 Greely, Informed Consent, supra note 113, at 789. 
123 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 56, at 410. 
124 Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998, § III, art. 8 (1998) (Ice.), available at 
http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/acts-of-Parliament/nr/17659#kafli1. 
125 Id. 
126 Jon F. Merz et al., “Iceland Inc.”?:  On the Ethics of Commercial Population Genomics, 58 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1201, 1203 (2004). 
127 See supra Part II.A (describing the HSD Act). 
128 Gibbons et al., supra note 15, at 110.  The type of consent necessary for collection of 
biological samples depends on whether the sample was obtained for donation to a biobank 
in the first instance or whether it was collected as part of a clinical diagnosis.  Id.  Scholars 
argue that this only suggests a presumed consent requirement for inclusion in the deCode 
database.  See Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 47 (describing the legislative 
exception that allows deCode to obtain biological samples without individual consent); see 
also Hsieh, supra note 73, at 378 (“The most controversial alternative to informed consent is 
the presumed consent provision of Iceland’s Health Sector Database.”). 
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require informed consent on its own for the genetic biobank.129  This sets 
up two separate consent regimes for the Iceland project.  First, Icelanders 
must opt-out of having their medical and personal data linked with 
genetic and genealogical data.  The HSD Act assumes consent for this 
piece of the project.130  Second, Icelanders must affirmatively give 
consent for inclusion in the genetic database.  The licensee, deCode, 
requires informed consent for all individuals.131 
Icelandic law states that consent to join a biological database can 
only be given for “clearly defined purposes,” so it would appear that 
researchers would have to obtain further consent for future uses of the 
sample.132  This may not be true, however, since the law also contains an 
exception granting the biobank broad discretion in authorizing 
subsequent uses of a biological sample under three conditions.133  Those 
conditions include when:  (1) significant interests are at issue; (2) the 
possible benefit eclipses the inconvenience to the donor; and (3) the 
biobank gains approval from a national ethics committee and the 
national authority in charge of data protection.134  This major exception 
creates, in essence, blanket consent for subsequent uses rather than truly 
requiring informed consent by the individual.  Withdrawal of 
information can be requested by the individual, but any results already 
obtained by use of the sample will not be destroyed.135 
Estonia takes a different approach and requires informed consent for 
participation in the national genetic database.  Individuals must sign a 
consent form after going through counseling sessions on the EGP.136  The 
consent form, though, supplies information on the EGP only to the 
extent necessary to foster an informed decision on whether to donate a 
sample.137  This broad consent incorporates subsequent uses.138  Estonia 
does not attempt an ongoing consent process for each distinct research 
use.139  Estonia does allow the individual to withdraw consent until the 
tissue samples or health data are encoded.140  This may be somewhat of a 
                                                 
129 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 47. 
130 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
131 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 47. 
132 Id. at 49. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 56, at 411. 
136 Gibbons et al., supra note 15, at 112. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  “The Estonian Genome Research Project is based on a very broad description of 
the project as a basis for consent.”  Id. 
139 Id.  Additional uses of the data must be disclosed at the beginning but not thereafter.  
Id. 
140 Hsieh, supra note 73, at 382. 
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hollow right, however, since the data processor encodes the information 
as soon as possible after collection.141  After encryption of the data, the 
donor may request destruction of the key that would enable decoding of 
the information.142  The EGP can still use the genetic sample and the 
health data, but it would be impossible to connect that data to an 
individual.143 
The UK project also seeks blanket informed consent that covers 
subsequent uses of the genetic sample.  UK Biobank states that 
“[b]ecause it will be impossible to anticipate all future uses, consent will 
be sought for research in general that is consistent with UK Biobank’s 
stated purpose (rather than for specific research),” though “[f]urther 
consent will be sought for any proposed activities that do not fall within 
the existing consent.”144  Essentially, if a future use does not fall within 
UK Biobank’s broadly stated goal—“to build a major resource that can 
support a diverse range of research intended to improve the prevention, 
diagnosis, and treatment of illness and the promotion of health 
throughout society”145—then future consent will be sought.  The last part 
of the stated goal, promotion of health, is so broad that a subsequent 
legal use of genetic samples that falls outside of that objective is difficult 
to imagine.  Participants may withdraw from UK Biobank at any time 
without explanation or penalty.146 
In the United States, the Common Rule on Protection of Human 
Subjects (“Common Rule”) governs human subjects research.147  The 
DHHS devised the Common Rule to safeguard the rights of human 
research subjects; it “applies to all non-exempt research conducted by or 
supported by [several] federal agencies.”148  A national biobank 
supported by the DHHS, for instance, would fall under this rule, which 
requires informed consent by the individual for each research project.149  
Presumably, then, blanket consent would not be acceptable under the 
Common Rule.  A genetic biobank, however, may seek to circumvent 
this regulation by claiming that its activities do not constitute human 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Cardinal & Deschênes, supra note 30, at 49. 
143 Id. 
144 UK BIOBANK, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
145 Id. at 3. 
146 McHale, supra note 7, at 85. 
147 LOWRANCE, supra note 67, at 3; see also Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human 
Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.10146.124 (2010) (detailing the Common Rule as applied 
to the Department of Health and Human Services). 
148 Jennifer Girod & Katherine Drabiak, A Proposal for Comprehensive Biobank Research Laws 
to Promote Transnational Medicine in Indiana, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 217, 220 (2008). 
149 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. 
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subjects research as defined by the Common Rule.150  The regulation 
states the following: 
 (b) Unless otherwise required by department or 
agency heads, research activities in which the only 
involvement of human subjects will be in one or more of 
the following categories are exempt from this policy: 
 
 . . . . 
 
 (4) Research, involving the collection or study of 
existing data, documents, records, pathological 
specimens, or diagnostic specimens, . . . if the 
information is recorded by the investigator in such a 
manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or 
through identifiers linked to the subjects.151 
The first collection of data would be covered by the Common Rule,152 
but subsequent uses that rely on existing data, such as biological samples 
stored in a biobank, appear to be exempted from the Common Rule’s 
protections.  In fact, OHRP explicitly states that it does not consider 
research performed on coded private information or specimens to 
involve human subjects as defined by the Common Rule when two 
conditions are met: 
(1) the private information or specimens were not 
collected specifically for the currently proposed research 
project through an interaction or intervention with 
living individuals; and 
 
(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the 
identity of the individual(s) to whom the coded private 
information or specimens pertain because, for example:  
[regulations are in place to separate the code key from 
the researchers].153 
Some scholars argue that this guidance should not apply to genetic 
biobanks because investigators could always “readily ascertain the 
                                                 
150 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 353. 
151 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4). 
152 Id. § 46.102(f). 
153 OHRP, supra note 94, at 3–4. 
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identity” of participants via characteristics of their genetic sample.154  For 
instance, the investigator could request updated information on a sample 
that is particularly distinctive of the person, forcing the biobank to 
contact the individual participant and potentially reveal the identity to a 
researcher.  As written, however, the OHRP guidelines appear to 
contemplate a genetic biobank and specifically exempt such institutions 
from the informed consent requirements of the Common Rule for any 
subsequent research uses.155 
The notion of informed consent is firmly embraced by common law 
and American tort law, and the Supreme Court has affirmed this 
principle, saying that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”156  
Performing a medical procedure on an individual without informed 
consent could result in a tort of common law battery.157  This doctrine, 
however, would likely apply only to the initial taking of the genetic 
sample when a health care worker would have to come into physical 
contact with the donor.  Physical force to the body of another is the 
touchstone of a common law battery.158 An individual may also have a 
colorable Fourth Amendment claim against unwarranted search and 
seizure if genetic samples are taken without informed consent.159  The 
Supreme Court has stated, “The basic purpose of [the Fourth] 
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by government officials.”160  The taking of a genetic sample 
and the subsequent testing of that sample without permission by the 
individual would likely be deemed an illegal search under Supreme 
Court doctrine.161  The text of the Fourth Amendment, though, only 
                                                 
154 Greely, Genomic Biobanks, supra note 16, at 354–55. 
155 Id. at 355–56.  The ethics of such a maneuver are certainly up for debate.  Id. at 356.  In 
addition, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) may prevent 
the future link to medical records without continued authorization, though this position is 
also up for debate.  See Rothstein, supra note 52, at 93–94. 
156 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting Schloendorff v. 
Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). 
157 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (allowing a case to reach 
the jury in which a youth submitted to a back surgery without being adequately informed 
of the risks). 
158 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (9th ed. 2009). 
159 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). 
160 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
161 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–19 (1989) (“[T]he 
permissibility of a particular practice ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
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protects against unreasonable searches; therefore, a court would attempt 
to determine whether the taking of the genetic sample was unreasonable 
by using the balancing test set forth in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Ass’n—“the permissibility of the search ‘is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”162 
Skinner upheld a search of railway employees for alcohol and drugs 
in the blood because of the employees’ diminished expectations of 
privacy in such a heavily regulated industry and the safety concerns at 
issue.163  Those concerns would not be present for a genetic biobank for a 
few reasons.  First, the holding in Skinner rested in part on the 
operational realities of the workplace; accidents in the railway industry 
can seriously harm the public, but drug and alcohol testing can provide a 
safeguard.164  Second, the Court stressed the diminished expectations of 
privacy inherent in such a heavily regulated industry.165  In contrast, the 
Fourth Amendment and various privacy statutes create the opposite 
expectation for U.S. citizens.  An average U.S. citizen would have no 
lowered expectation of privacy when using a genetic biobank. 
In other cases, the Court affirmed that such a search without 
individualized suspicion is only permissible in limited circumstances, 
such as border checkpoints, sobriety checkpoints, and administrative 
inspections in closely regulated businesses.166  The research interests that 
are pervasive in a genetic biobank should not tip the balance of 
reasonableness in favor of the government either.  Research does not 
have the same import as safety on a railroad; though public health may 
be helped in the long run, research does not have the immediate impact 
of, for example, ensuring railroad engineers are not drunk on the job. 
The Common Rule and Supreme Court precedent require informed 
consent by the individual for at least the initial donation of the genetic 
sample.  Subsequent uses of the sample, however, may not require 
separate consent of the individual.  A claim could be made that 
subsequent uses qualify as unreasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, because such testing could reveal new information about 
the donor.  As noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized 
                                                                                                             
interests.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979))); see also United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (weighing government searches against the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests). 
162 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654) (internal quotations omitted). 
163 Id. at 624–25. 
164 Id. at 628–30. 
165 Id. at 627. 
166 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (citing cases upholding the limited 
right to conduct searches “without grounds for suspicion”). 
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subsequent testing as a separate search from the initial collection.  In that 
case, however, the balancing of harms may look quite different.  For one 
thing, the individual’s expectation of privacy must be lower because the 
person must have already consented to donating the genetic sample to a 
biobank.  That consent would presumably include a statement of 
possible future research.  Furthermore, the additional harm to the person 
would possibly be lower than the harm of extracting a genetic sample in 
the first instance.  While a future study may reveal one more gene or 
condition, the initial taking of the genetic sample could possibly reveal a 
litany of conditions in the individual, including drug use, sexually 
transmitted infections, or a variety of genetic conditions. 
C. Feedback of Clinically Significant Information 
Traditional public health screening programs, like those for 
cardiovascular issues, are intended to encourage people to obtain 
medical care to prevent or treat disease.  Indeed, they serve little purpose 
without a connection to medical care.167  Similarly, a genetic biobank 
may produce great advances in biomedical research, but it would not 
protect the interests of participants without a connection to 
individualized care.168  For example, consider a woman participant in a 
national biobank whose genetic analysis turned up a deleterious BRCA1 
gene.  Inheritance of a harmful mutation in BRCA1 significantly 
increases a woman’s risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer; some 
estimates predict that sixty percent of women who carry a BRCA1 gene 
mutation will develop breast cancer at some point in their lives, 
compared to rates as low as twelve percent of women in the general 
population who do not have the BRCA1 genetic mutation.169  Disclosure 
of the genetic test may allow the woman to stave off the worst 
consequences of breast cancer through early detection programs or 
preventative measures. 
A genetic biobank must balance this benefit of disclosure with two 
competing concerns.  First, an individual has the right not to know.  A 
woman may wish to live in ignorance of a medical condition rather than 
                                                 
167 See Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health and Law:  Past and Future Vision, 28 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 525, 534–35 (2003) (“[Public health screening programs] serve little purpose 
without links to medical treatment.”). 
168 Many patients may expect feedback of clinically significant information or even small, 
incremental risks.  Jasper Bovenberg et al., Biobank Research: Reporting Results to Individual 
Participants, 16 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 229, 237 (2009). 
169 BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 29, 
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA. 
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live with the known increased risk of breast cancer weighing on her.170  
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
supports this right not to know; it states that “[t]he right of each 
individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results of genetic 
examination and the resulting consequences should be respected.”171  
Second, genetic tests reveal information about third parties who may not 
be participating in the biobank and do not wish to know or have others 
know about their medical conditions.  Thus, a genetic biobank must 
choose to balance between the benefit of revealing information and the 
harm to third parties and willfully ignorant participants. 
Of the countries studied in this Article, only Estonia provides a 
mechanism for feedback of clinically significant information to reach the 
individual donor.172  Iceland’s HSD Act makes no mention of receiving 
feedback.  An Icelander can obtain certain processing information, but 
that right is qualified if the person’s right is deemed subordinate to other 
interests, including the interests of others.173  Similarly, UK Biobank only 
provides feedback to consenting patients “on measures taken at the 
physical assessment.”174  It “will not provide participants with 
information (genetic or otherwise) about their own individual results 
derived from examination of the database or samples by research 
undertaken after enrolment.”175  Estonia, though, gives feedback to gene 
donors who affirmatively request such information.176  This protects the 
right not to know, but it does not completely fulfill any duty to provide 
clinically significant information because the gene donor must actively 
request the information.  Estonia’s EGP does not seek out donors who 
would benefit from personal genetic information. 
                                                 
170 Anne Maria Skrikerud, Information Rights on the Edge of Ignorance, in THE ETHICS OF 
RESEARCH BIOBANKING 49, 54 (Jan Helge Solbakk, Søren Holm & Bjørn Hofmann eds., 
2009).  The right could be considered either the liberty to refrain from being informed or 
the right to ignorance.  Id.  The former puts the burden on the individual to avoid 
information, while the latter puts the burden on the biobank not to inform.  Id.  For 
purposes of this Article, the right not to know deals with actions by the biobank. 
171 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UNESCO Gen. 
Conf. Res. 29 C/Res. 16, reprinted in Records of the General Conference, UNESCO, 29th 
Sess., 29 C/Res. 19, at 41 (1997) (adopted by the UN General Assembly, G.A. Res. 152, U.N. 
GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (1999)) (emphasis added), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001102/110220e.pdf#page=47. 
172 Gibbons et al., supra note 15, at 124. 
173 Hsieh, supra note 73, at 393. 
174 Carolyn Johnston & Jane Kaye, Does the UK Biobank Have a Legal Obligation to Feedback 
Individual Findings to Participants?, 12 MED. L. REV. 239, 239 (2004). 
175 UK BIOBANK, supra note 90, at 8.  British legal holdings may supply a duty to warn to 
UK Biobank.  Johnston & Kaye, supra note 174, at 246. 
176 Main provisions, supra note 85. 
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The U.S. regime, however, may be more complicated if a genetic 
biobank draws on the clinical physician’s experience of a duty to warn.  
This duty has been discussed in various state courts, but no federal 
holding guides the decisions.  In 1996, a New Jersey court held in Safer v. 
Estate of Pack that physicians have a duty to warn against foreseeable 
risks that can be eliminated or mitigated by timely intervention.177  In 
that case, a physician failed to warn a daughter that her father was 
diagnosed with hereditary colonic polyps that could lead to cancer.  
Forty years after the father’s diagnosis, the daughter sued the physician 
for failing to warn her of the risk.178  Safer explicitly rejected a Florida 
case that held that physicians only had a duty to warn their patients and 
not third parties who may be affected by the genetic disorder.179  
Treating physicians do not escape this duty when they also act as 
researchers.180 
These cases, though, all deal with treating physicians who have 
direct and ongoing contact with the patient and related third parties.  
While it has been suggested that researchers who are not treating 
physicians may owe a similar duty to warn,181 no case has firmly 
established that principle.  The U.S. National Bioethics Advisory 
Committee advises that disclosure of research results to participants 
should be an exceptional circumstance and occur only under the 
following three conditions:  “(1) the findings are scientifically valid and 
confirmed, (2) the findings have significant implications for the 
participant’s health concerns, and (3) a course of action to ameliorate or 
treat these concerns is readily available.”182  This would impose a duty to 
warn on researchers for certain conditions, such as a deleterious BRCA1 
gene, but not others for which the science is questionable or no therapy 
yet exists.  Although this canon may produce the benefits of feedback in 
some instances, it creates a nebulous standard for researchers who must 
decide whether the science is clear or a valid treatment is available.  
What level of consensus in the scientific community is necessary for a 
finding to be valid?  What constitutes a valid treatment?  And to whom 
must the treatment be available?  These questions have not yet been 
answered, but would be critical in determining the appropriate standard 
for feedback of clinically significant information found by a biobank. 
                                                 
177 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
178 Id. at 1189–90. 
179 See id. at 1192–93 (declining to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Pate v. 
Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995)). 
180 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485–86 (Cal. 1990). 
181 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 836 (Md. 2001). 
182 McHale, supra note 7, at 91. 
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IV.  STRUCTURE OF A POSSIBLE BIOBANK FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The experiences of Iceland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom in 
establishing a national genetic database can provide important lessons 
on privacy and confidentiality, informed consent, and feedback of 
clinically significant information for a potential genetic biobank for the 
United States, which must also be conscious of the existing regulatory 
and legal framework.  With that foundation in mind, this Part will 
explore the potential structure of a U.S. genetic biobank.183 
All three international biobanks utilize some type of coding 
technique.184  The leading alternative—anonymization—leads to a much 
less scientifically useful biobank because researchers cannot utilize 
updated information.  Iceland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom 
recognized this limitation and implemented a key code system to protect 
confidential medical information, but still allow for an active biobank.  
Estonia adds an extra layer of security by using a double coding system 
that separates personal information from medical and genetic data.  U.S. 
regulations from OHRP offer the same conclusion as the international 
databases:  information should be coded rather than anonymized.  This 
provides the best balance between privacy and usefulness.  Furthermore, 
U.S. legal doctrine protects against illegal breaches of privacy.  
Individuals have a privacy right in protecting the confidentiality of 
important medical information. 
Therefore, a U.S. biobank should utilize a coding system.  Taking 
Estonia’s double coding system one step further, the U.S. database 
should use a triple coding system, as shown in Figure 1.185  This system 
will protect against unscrupulous individuals matching up health and 
personal data with the genetic sample but still allow researchers to use 
updated demographic and environmental data throughout the life of the 
biobank. 
                                                 
183 This will focus on a biobank with some government involvement.  Wholly private 
companies could also create large research databases using volunteers.  They would face 
many of the same issues presented in this Article, excluding, for example, the Fourth 
Amendment issue of unwarranted search and seizure due to lack of state action. 
184 See supra Part III.A (discussing confidentiality and privacy issues). 
185 The United States biobank would contain three different codes, represented in Figure 
1 by the keys necessary to undo the coding:  a genetic key, a clinical key, and a master key. 
The coding system thus provides three levels of protection, rather than the two codes given 
in Estonia. 
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Figure 1.  The triple coding system would provide heightened 
protection of all data. 
The coding system process would be conducted as follows.  First, 
health data would be collected by a healthcare worker.  This data would 
then be passed to a processor to assign a random sixteen-digit key to the 
data.  Health data collection is an ongoing process, as shown by the 
double arrows in Figure 1.  This allows the information to be regularly 
updated, which is one of the advantages that the coding system provides 
over complete anonymization. 
Second, a trained biobank technician collects a genetic sample from 
the donor.  To maintain confidentiality for the donor, the technician 
would not be the same person as the health data collector; the technician 
would not know any of the donor’s health data.  The genetic sample 
would then be passed to a processor to assign it a sixteen-digit key 
distinct from the health data key.  With two separate keys, an individual 
who possesses the genetic key still cannot connect the genetic sample to 
a donor’s health data.  Similarly, an individual who decodes the clinical 
key cannot connect that data to a specific genetic sample. 
Third, each processor (clinical and genetic) sends the encrypted data 
to a master processor who links the two codes with a master code, a 
third unique sixteen-digit code.  The master processor holds the master 
key—the only key that can connect genetic samples to health data.  The 
master key will be kept in a highly secure database controlled by a select 
number of processors.  This ensures that few eyes can view the data.  All 
master processors will be under confidentiality oaths and threatened 
with criminal sanctions for a violation.  If a breach does occur, the 
number of possible culprits will be small, likely leading to immediate 
sanctions and restitution for the victim. 
Researchers at the biobank receive health and genetic data coupled 
together under the master code.  They can request updates to the health 
and environmental data, as shown by the double arrows from the 
biobank back to the health data collection, but this request must go 
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through the master key and clinical key to ensure confidentiality.  No 
coding system can ensure that researchers will not deviously request 
highly specific information in an attempt to ascertain the identity of a 
genetic sample, but the U.S. legal system should supply the necessary 
protection for unnecessary infringements of privacy.186 Such 
unwarranted invasions would certainly fail the Westinghouse factors:  
there is no research need for access to the personal information; the type 
of record sought has no bearing on research purposes; the potential harm 
is a constitutional violation of the right to privacy of sensitive medical 
information; disclosure could harm the relationship between the general 
population and the biobank if the public loses trust in the biobank and 
refuses to provide additional data; and an express statutory mandate, or 
at least an articulated public policy, requires that such information 
remain private.187  A researcher who seeks out such information should 
be punished, and the victim should receive compensation.  The U.S. legal 
system buttresses a coding system to promote privacy of all information 
collected by the biobank. 
A genetic biobank may test the boundaries of informed consent, as 
evidenced by the presumed consent model of Iceland and the blanket 
consent prevalent in Estonia and the United Kingdom.188  Presumed 
consent, while making the work of a biobank easier, suffered from such a 
backlash in Iceland that the licensee, deCode, decided to seek informed 
consent on its own.  Informed consent, though, does not truly appear to 
be completely informed consent for a biobank.  Rather, informed consent 
has become blanket consent.  For example, Estonia only seeks informed 
consent on the issue of whether the participant wishes to donate in the 
first instance; the participant does not give informed consent each time 
the sample is used for a new and distinct research purpose.  The 
exigencies of a biobank have created this warping of informed consent 
because future uses of the data cannot be anticipated at the time of 
collection.  It would be prohibitively expensive to build a biobank for 
one research project and equally ineffective to seek out consent for each 
individual study.  The OHRP guidelines seem to accept this reality by 
requiring informed consent only for the initial collection of data and 
blanket consent for subsequent uses.  The Supreme Court may require 
                                                 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 96–104 (identifying case law discussing the 
constitutional right of privacy). 
187 See supra text accompanying note 104 (listing the Westinghouse factors).  Cf. United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (delineating factors to 
determine whether privacy rights have been infringed);. 
188 See supra Part III.B (discussing informed consent and humans as research subjects). 
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extra protection, but it is not clear that subsequent research without 
traditional informed consent would fail the balancing test of Skinner.189 
A U.S. biobank, however, can work with the realities of the situation 
and attempt to include informed consent as an ongoing process rather 
than marginalize it as blanket consent at the outset.  Participants in the 
U.S. biobank should be given biannual updates of the research at the 
biobank, including current and proposed future studies and the eventual 
uses of that research.  Each donor must then affirmatively elect to remain 
in the biobank by signing a written authorization form included in the 
biobank update.  The active decision to remain in the biobank is key to 
not allowing informed consent to become presumed consent.  This also 
allows the participant the option to withdraw, maintaining donor 
autonomy in the process.  This ongoing informed consent process should 
strike an appropriate balance between protecting donors as human 
research subjects and allowing a biobank to operate as planned.  Future 
research projects can continue without cost- and time-prohibitive 
consent for each study.  At the same time, donors must actively choose to 
continue participation in the biobank; their consent cannot be presumed 
in the absence of an affirmative withdrawal. 
Finally, the U.S. biobank must meet the challenge of providing 
feedback of clinically significant information despite a nebulous legal 
mandate from state courts.190  Iceland and the United Kingdom both 
avoid the issue by refusing to provide feedback.  Specifically, UK 
Biobank will provide the usual clinical information to the donor, much 
like any routine doctor visit, but the donor will never receive 
individualized feedback from the genetic studies.191  The participant will 
not learn of genetic predispositions from UK Biobank.  In Estonia, the 
donor must actively seek out the information; researchers at EGP will 
not initiate the feedback.192  The situation of biobanks is further 
complicated by the corollary right not to know—the donor may wish to 
live in blissful ignorance of any genetic factor that could lead to disease.  
In the United States, any duty to warn imposed by courts or advised by 
bioethics committees appears to hinge on the validity of the science, the 
                                                 
189 See supra text accompanying note 162 (describing the Skinner test as “balancing [the] 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests”). 
190 See supra Part III.C (discussing issues related to feedback of clinically significant 
information). 
191 See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text (discussing UK Biobank’s mechanism 
for feedback of clinically significant information). 
192 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (explaining Estonia’s mechanism for 
feedback). 
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foreseeability of the victim, and the availability of treatment.193  
Unfortunately, genetic research is not so straightforward at this time to 
create bright line legal rules for researchers.  In addition, it is not clear 
that a researcher who is not also the treating physician has a legal 
responsibility to provide this feedback. 
Until those legal questions are solved, the U.S. biobank should not 
place the burden on the researcher to provide immediate feedback on 
clinically significant information.  Instead, the United States should 
adopt a hybrid system that crosses the UK and Estonian regimes.  For 
clinical information, the participant should receive feedback on 
abnormal results—such as the UK Biobank provides.  This fulfills the 
requirements of most jurisdictions that impose a duty to warn.  The 
treating physician or healthcare worker who collects health data from the 
individual is acting as a treating physician; they come into personal 
contact with the donor and can provide traditional medical aid.  For 
genetic data, the Estonian regime should guide the U.S. biobank policy.  
Donors must actively seek out their own information from the biobank.  
This accomplishes two aims.  First, the right not to know can be 
protected.  The donor can either choose to know of a genetic risk or live 
in ignorance.  Second, researchers will not have to entangle themselves 
in the unclear legal doctrines that currently surround a duty to warn of 
genetic risk.  The onus would be on the donor to seek out the genetic 
information. 
This balance could be reversed, however, by stricter regulations from 
DHHS that clearly define which genetic risks should be communicated 
to donors.  For example, if the DHHS determines that knowledge of a 
deleterious BRCA1 gene would be clinically useful and significant 
information for a donor, regulations on the biobank could require such 
information to be passed back to a donor.  Rather than force each 
researcher to determine whether the findings are scientifically valid or 
whether a treatment for the genetic risk is available, a national body of 
scientists can review current genetic knowledge and create uniform 
standards.  The right not to know this information could be protected by 
explicit refusal to know of genetic risks by the donor.  For instance, in the 
informed consent process, the donor could make it clear that he does not 
want to learn of the genetic risks that may be uncovered by the biobank.  
Those who want to learn of the risks can benefit from feedback of 
clinically significant information, while those who wish to remain in 
ignorance can employ the right not to know. 
                                                 
193 See supra notes 177–81 (discussing state case law in the United States). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Before the United States implements a national biobank, public fears 
over misuse of genetic information must be calmed.  Focusing on privacy 
and confidentiality, informed consent, and feedback of clinically 
significant information can begin to alleviate concerns by providing a 
solid ethical and legal framework that protects individual donors from 
misappropriation of genetic and health data.  The biobanks of Iceland, 
Estonia, and the United Kingdom all provide important lessons for a 
domestic database as the United States steps boldly into a “brave new 
world.” 
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